In practice, collusive bidders' rings in English auctions with a single object frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core, two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.
Introduction
A bidding ring is a group of collusive members who secretly agree not to compete against one another at an auction. Bidding rings have been operated throughout the world. For example, Cassady (1967) reported bidding rings in many commodity …e l d s , such as antique trading, …s h trading, and timber rights. Bidding rings reduce or eliminate buyer competition at auctions, thereby securing an advantage over the sellers. Cassady (1967) explained that a bidding ring allocates an object won at auction and divides collusive gains via a re-auction. This re-auction is called a knockout.
1 A knockout is an oral ascending bid auction called an English auction among the ring members. When bidders have di¤erent evaluations for the object being auctioned, a sequence of knockouts is produced. In practice, some sequences of knockouts have been observed. For example, Cassady (1967) reported the sequence in an antique trade, and Deltas (2002) described the sequence in an auction of used commercial equipment (case of U.S. v. Seville Industrial Machinery Corp.).
The purpose of the present study is to develop a cooperative game theoretic framework in order to analyze the distributive function of sequences of knockouts. In the present framework, we can deal with the following problems. Why would a ring decide to distribute the gains by means of sequences of knockouts? What, if any, are the advantages to sequences of knockouts? Economists have paid very little attention to these problems.
The motivation for the present study stems from the fact that most of the US Department of Justice's bid-rigging convictions are a result of whistleblowers who are dissatis…ed with their distributive outcomes, e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Milgrom (2004) . This fact demonstrates that the distribution of gains from collusion among ring members is a serious problem that must be overcome by bidding rings. Therefore, it is important to reveal whether sequential knockouts yield satisfactory outcomes for ring members.
Toward the purpose of the present study, a generic model of sequences of knockouts with a single object is introduced. This model is applied to a bidding ring game, which is a coalitional game with transferable utility. Bidding ring games deal with sharing problems of gains obtained through collusion.
ing that each sequence yields an element of the core; and one sequence yields the Shapley value while another sequence yields the nucleolus. Each solution represents a satisfactory outcome for ring members, and hence a ring would decide to distribute the gains by means of sequences of knockouts. Moreover, in general, each of the Shapley value and the nucleolus is not yielded by a single knockout. Ring members would produce sequential knockouts if they intend toward egalitarianism or minimization of the greatest dissatisfaction of any bidders' coalition. Thus, the results indicate that sequential knockouts are advantageous.
In the model of the present study, weak asymmetry of information among buyers is introduced. Namely, each buyer has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all buyers for the object before the main auction. This situation is more informative than that in the independent private values model, but this situation requires sequences of knockouts in order to elicit the evaluations of buyers for the object. The evaluations of all buyers can be ordered by giving points to each buyer according to (I) the number of times in the past the buyer has participated in bidding, and (II) the size of the buyer's bid on the occasion of his winning at an auction in the past. This method for ordering the evaluations of buyers was adopted by bidding rings in Japan, e.g., McMillan (1991) . Using weak asymmetry of information, a ring formation at each knockout is characterized.
In the literature on knockouts, collusive behavior of bidders in knockouts has both non-cooperative and cooperative aspects. Regarding the noncooperative aspect of collusive behavior, the bidder's strategic behavior has been analyzed under the independent private values model, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987) , Graham et al. (1990) 2 and Mailath and Zemsky (1991). On the other hand, there has been little research on the cooperative aspects of collusive behavior. 3 Graham et al. (1990) considered only a single sequential knockout yielding the Shapley value. The present study provides a generic model of sequential knockouts including the sequence in Graham et al. (1990) . Therefore, the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus will be emphasized.
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the bidding ring game and cooperative solutions. Section 3 introduces the model of sequences of knockouts. In addition, this section reports the basic properties of sequential knockouts concerning the core and the Shapley value. Section 4 establishes a particular sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus. 2 Although Graham et al. (1990) used the bidding ring game partially, they considered primarily the bidder's strategic behavior under the independent private values model. 3 The game structure of bidding ring games has been investigated, e.g., Oishi (2006) and van den Brink et al (2007) . However, they did not deal with sequences of knockouts.
The present study provides a rationale for sequences of knockouts by show-2 De…nitions and preliminaries
Bidding ring games
English auctions are oral auctions in which an auctioneer initially sets a bid at a low price and then gradually increases the price until only one bidder remains active.
Assume that there are n buyers in a single object English auction. Let
where v i is the evaluation of each buyer i = 1;
; n for the object and v 0 is the reservation price of the only seller for his object. In addition, we assume that there is no asymmetry of information among buyers; that is, each buyer has information on the evaluations of all buyers for the object before the main auction.
A bidding ring game in an English auction is a coalitional game with transferable utility, namely a TU game de…ned by Graham et al. (1990) .
Let N = f1; ; ng be the …n i t e set of buyers, and let S N be a coalition. Consider an English auction with the possibility of a bidding ring among buyers of the auction under non-asymmetric information. This situation can be described as the TU game (N; v) satisfying
where max j= 2N v j v 0 : Note that v is a characteristic function as a real valued function on 2 N satisfying v(;) = 0: We refer to this game as the bidding ring game.
The above characteristic function v(S) denotes the net gains that S can obtain by itself. This function is based on the following. First, under the English auction rule, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to remain active until bidding reaches his evaluation. Second, any coalition including buyer 1 can win the auction with the net gains v 1 max j = 2S v j by making buyer 1 the sole bidder in the coalition. Finally, in any coalition that does not include buyer 1, the coalition does not win the auction, and hence the net gain is 0:
2.2 The core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus An n-dimensional vector x of the bidding ring game is a payo¤ vector if it satis…es P i2N x i = v(N): Then, the core of this game is a set of payo¤ vectors x satisfying the stability conditions
The core embodies a pattern of coalitional stability of the bidding ring.
Next, the Shapley value (N; v) of this game is a payo¤ vector given by the following formula
As is well known, the Shapley value describes a pattern of egalitarianism. The goal is to distribute the gains from trade equally. 4 For more accounts of the Shapley value, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) .
Finally, the nucleolus is de…ned as the imputation that minimizes the greatest dissatisfaction of any bidders' coalition in the following sense. A payo¤ vector x is called an imputation if x satis…es the individual rationality con-
Let X be the set of all imputations of the bidding ring game. Obviously, X 6 = ;: Given an imputation x 2 X, the excess of a coalition S with respect to x is de…ned as the number v(S) P i2S x i . The excess of a coalition S with respect to x is a measure of the dissatisfaction that the coalition S feels when x is proposed. Let e(x) be the (2 n 2)-dimensional vector, the components of which are the excesses of every nonempty coalition S 6 = N with respect to x, arranged in decreasing order. The nucleolus (N; v) is de…ned as a set of imputations such that the vector e(x) is lexicographically minimal over X. The nucleolus (N; v) is never empty and is a singleton (Schmeidler, 1969) .
Remark 1 Since the bidding ring game is convex, 5 (i) the core of this game is nonempty and (ii) the Shapley value and the nucleolus belong to the core.
Sequences of knockouts 3.1 The model
Next, the model of sequences of knockouts is described using the notations in Section 2. At an English auction, bidding rings distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts.
Knockouts elicit buyers' evaluations for the object in order to distribute collusive gains among the buyers. Assume weak asymmetry of information among n buyers. Then, each buyer has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all buyers for the object, namely 1 2 n, before the main auction. A relation i j for i; j 2 N and i 6 = j means that the evaluation of buyer i is higher than that of buyer j: The auctioneers of the main auction and knockouts have no information concerning buyers' evaluations. The reservation price v 0 is publicly announced to n buyers.
There exists the possibility of a bidding ring, which consists of n buyers, in the main auction. This is because, under the English auction rule, the gains of collusive behavior strictly dominate those of non-cooperative behavior. 6 Assume that n buyers form an initial ring R 0 = N: In the main auction, (i) buyer 1 remains active in the bidding up to his valuation v 1 ; and (ii) each of the buyers except for buyer 1 remains active in the bidding up to v 0 or does not participate. The goal of the operation of R 0 is to eliminate competition among the members of R 0 : This competitive elimination implies that R 0 can guarantee the maximal gains of R 0 . The bidders other than buyer 1 are phantom bidders in this auction. Buyer 1 wins the main auction and pays v 0 to the seller. Since buyer 1 is the representative of R 0 ; R 0 gains ownership of the object won at the auction.
After the main auction, a sequence of knockouts is produced. The sequence of knockouts has two key points. First, the size of a ring at each knockout shrinks consecutively. Second, at each knockout a recursive process on distribution is used.
We assume a ring center. 7 The ring center has two roles, namely, as an auctioneer of each knockout and as a neutral distributor to the members of R 0 . After the …n a l knockout, the ring center has neither gain nor loss.
The sequence of knockouts is described in detail as follows.
(A) A knockout: Given the j 1 th and j th rings, R j 1 = f1; 2; ; m j 1 g ) R j = f1; 2;
; m j g; where m j < m j 1 and m 0 n; the j th knockout is a tuple
Note that K j = f1g [~K j [ (R j 1 nR j ); where~K j R j nf1g: K j is the set of participants of the j th knockout, (v ) 2K j are the private values of the participants, and E is the English auction rule in the knockout. Here, let k j be the number of the participants of the j th knockout, namely k j = jK j j. 6 For example, see the introduction in Graham et al (1990) . 7 A ring center is considered in the literature concerning non-cooperative analysis of knockouts as well, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987) .
In the j th knockout, (a) the members of R j appoint buyer 1 to remain active in the bidding up to his valuation v 1 ; and (b) they appoint each of the buyers other than buyer 1 to remain active in the bidding up to v m j +1 or not to participate. The valuation v m j +1 is observable to the members of R j at the the j th knockout. The goal of the operation of R j is the same as that of the operation of R 0 . Each member of R j 1 nR j bids competitively at the j th knockout. Thus,
The lower bound of k j means that the members of R j 1 other than R j nf1g participate in the j th knockout. The upper bound of k j means that the members of R j 1 participate in the j th knockout.
It is essential to form a ring by consecutive buyers at each knockout. For example, N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and R 1 = f1; 2g: Buyer 1 wins the …r s t knockout and pays v 3 to the ring center. Even if buyer 4 joins R 1 ; buyer 1 wins the knockout and pays v 3 to the ring center. In this case, buyer 4 does not have a role of reducing the payments of buyer 1. If R 1 intends to reduce the payments of buyer 1, R 1 will be reformed as R 1 = f1; 2; 3g: Thus, R 1 consists of consecutive buyers. Similarly, each ring consists of consecutive buyers at the other knockouts. Using weak asymmetry of information, ring members at the j th knockout can form R j = f1; 2;
; m j g: Note that buyer m j is the ring member whose private value is the lowest in R j :
(B) A sequence of knockouts: A sequence of knockouts is given by
It is possible for the knockouts to continue in the manner stated in (A) for j = 1; 2; ; t such that R t = f1g: In the …n a l knockout, buyer 1 is determined as the …n a l owner of the object. In addition, the distributive outcome of the members of R 0 is determined.
(C) Distributive process: If an arbitrary sequence of knockouts is …x e d , the distributive outcome of the sequence of knockouts is de…ned as follows:
be a distributive outcome of the sequence of knockouts. Let R j = f1; 2;
; m j g; where m j < m j 1 ; and let the number of participants of the j th knockout be given by k j ; where m j 1 m j + 1
; where k t = m t 1 ; z i is de…ned inductively by z 1 = v 1 v 2 + z t and
beginning with m 0 n; P n l=m 0 +1 z l 0 and continuing for j = 1; ; t:
The underlying scenario of De…nition 1 is as follows. Consider an arbitrarily …x e d j th knockout. Buyer 1 wins the j th knockout and pays v m j +1 to the ring center. Since buyer 1 is the representative of R j ; R j gains ownership of the object. As a result of the j th knockout, the ring center has the surplus v m j +1 v 0 P n l=m j 1 +1 z l : The ring center divides this surplus among the participants of the j th knockout equally and then disburses this equal distribution to the members of R j 1 nR j : Each member of R j 1 nR j receives the above equal distribution z i for m j + 1 i m j 1 and leaves the ring. It is possible for the knockouts to continue the above distributive behavior for j = 1; 2;
; t such that R t = f1g:
The following remark illustrates money transfer among the ring members and the ring center.
Remark 2 Let v 1 = $120; v 2 = $90; v 3 = $70; and v 0 = $10: Consider a sequence of knockouts:
E given R 0 = f1; 2; 3g; R 1 = f1; 2g; and R 2 = f1g:
Step 1: Before the …r s t knockout, R 0 exchanges a single object for $10 via the ring center, and the ring center has a debt of $10. Here, R 0 gives $10 to buyer 1 in compensation for buyer 1's payment in the main auction. In the …r s t knockout, buyer 1 wins and pays $70 to the ring center. The ring center receives the surplus $60 because $70 $10. The ring center pays $60=3 (= $20) only to buyer 3. The ring center then has $40.
Step 2: Before the second knockout, R 1 exchanges the object for $70 via the ring center. The ring center has a debt of $30 (= $70 $40). R 1 gives $70 to buyer 1 in compensation for buyer 1's payment in the …r s t knockout. In the second knockout, buyer 1 wins and pays $90 to the ring center. Thus, buyer 1 gains …n a l ownership of the object and obtains a net gain of $120 $90 = $30. The ring center obtains the surplus $60 (= $90 $30). The ring center pays $60=2 (= $30) only to buyer 2. Finally, the ring center distributes the remaining $30 to buyer 1. Thus, the distributive outcome of this sequence is ($60; $30; $20).
Basic properties of sequential knockouts
Next, the basic properties of the sequences of knockouts are stated. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core. In addition, a particular sequence yields the Shapley value.
Proposition 1 Each distributive outcome of the sequential knockouts belongs to the core.
Proof. Let z 2 R n be the distributive outcome of the sequential knockouts. By De…nition 1, z is a payo¤ vector. If 1 = 2 S; then
; m j g); because z i > 0:
which completes the proof.
Proposition 2 Let the -sequence of knockouts be given by
; n jg and K j = R j 1 consecutively for j = 1; 2; ; n 1: Then, the distributive outcome of the -sequence of knockouts is the Shapley value.
Proof. By calculation, we …n d that the outcome of the -sequence is the same as Theorem 2 in Graham et al. (1990) .
A sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus
In the above propositions, the distributive outcomes of the sequential knockouts under weak asymmetric information are characterized by cooperative game solutions under non-asymmetric information. In this section, the same statement can be made for the case of the nucleolus. At the j th knockout, the value of the distribution of the ring center is given by formula (5). Consider the situation in which the value of formula (5) is minimal with respect to jR j j, given K j = f1g [ (R j 1 nR j ) consecutively for j = 1; 2;
; t; such that R t = 1. Note that at the j th knockout the value of the formula (5) depends only on jR j j ; given (R l )
De…nition 2 The -sequence of knockouts is
satisfying the condition that the value of the distribution at the j th knockout is minimal with respect to jR j j, given (R l ) j 1 l=0 and K j = f1g[(R j 1 nR j ) consecutively for j = 1; 2;
; t; such that R t = 1:
The following proposition gives the distributive outcome of the -sequence. Each step of the algorithm in this proposition describes the distributive process at each knockout of the -sequence. Proposition 3 Let (x i ) i2N be a distributive outcome of the -sequence of knockouts. Let M i = v i v 0 for each i 2 N: Then, x i is given by x i = t and 
where k t denotes the largest value of k for which the above expression attains its minimum, and m t = m t 1 k t + 1 (beginning with m 0 n; 0 0 and continuing for t = 1; ; t 0 ; such that m t 0 = 1).
Proof. The proof will be completed by the following two steps.
Step 1 : At the …r s t knockout, the value of the distribution is given by 1 = min k=2; ;n M n k+2 k :
Each member of R 0 nR 1 receives 1 as his distributive outcome. Take k 1 as a k giving 1 . Let R 1 = f1; ; m 1 g: Then, m 1 = n k 1 + 1: At the second knockout, the value of the distribution is given by 
Each member of R 1 nR 2 receives 2 as his distributive outcome. Take k 2 as a k giving 2 . Let R 2 = f1; ; m 2 g: Then, m 2 = m 1 k 2 +1: Similarly, the same procedure can be repeated until the distributive outcome of each member of R 0 is determined. because M n k 00 +2 k 00
This alternative formula follows from Proposition 3. Let (N; c) be a simple version of a cost sharing game referred to as the airport game, as proposed by Littlechild (1974) , with one aircraft of each type, namely c(S) = max i2S C i for each S N satisfying c(;) = 0: Note that C i is the construction cost of the runway for the aircraft of type i: Let C i = M i for each i 2 N, so that C 1 > C 2 > > C n : Then, the alternative formula of the -sequence can be regarded as Sönmez's formula of the nucleolus of the airport game (N; c) (Sönmez, 1994) . Owing to the anti-dual relation introduced by Oishi and Nakayama (2009), the nucleolus of the bidding ring game (N; v) coincides with that of the airport game (N; c) . Therefore, the alternative formula of the -sequence gives the nucleolus of the bidding ring game. Thus, the proof is completed.
